How lockdown aided counter-insurgency ops

In March 22, as Indians stood on their doorsteps and balconies to bang thalis to express their gratitude to the nation’s coronavirus warriors, bodies of 17 Central Reserve Police Force personnel were being recovered from the dense jungles of Chintagufa in Chhattisgarh’s Sukma district.The fear of the pandemic was so acute that everything else, including the deadly Maoist attack, failed to be a talking point. The Bastar Police, which handle seven districts, including Sukma, too, had to shift focus to enforce a nationwide lockdown that began three days later. The construction of three new police camps had to be stopped, and counter-insurgency operations had to be sustained with limited forces and less vigour.But as the lockdown continued into the next month, the security forces sensed an opportunity. They changed tactics, intensifying their operations and cornering insurgents stuck in their hideouts. The trend was visible in all three conflict zones in India — Kashmir Valley, the Northeast, and in Bastar where the police have to remain extra vigilant between February and June, a deadly period when the Maoists traditionally launch premeditated attacks on the forces.While talking to ET Magazine over the phone from Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir’s Director General of Police Dilbag Singh describes how a focus on battling Covid-19 in the initial period of the lockdown shifted to an escalation of counter-insurgency offensive. 76663788“To some extent, the lockdown impacted our counter-insurgency operations for some time. When things got stabilised on Covid-19 in J&K, we shifted our attention to operations. We did pretty well in May, and June so far has been exemplary and a record of sorts in the counter-insurgency operations of the last 10 years. As on June 24, 15 successful operations were carried out and 40 militants were neutralised,” he says, adding that the number of new local recruits of terror outfits has come down drastically in the last few months. According to South Asia Terrorism Portal, run by Delhi-based Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), as many as 83 militants, including commanders of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen, were killed in J&K between April 1 and June 23, as against 63 in the same period last year. More security forces, too, lost their lives: 24 as against 14.ICM’s executive director, Ajai Sahni, says, “The logistics and network of the insurgents across conflict zones got disrupted during the lockdown while the government channels have all been functioning.” Unlike in a normal year, he says, this time the initiative to confront has come from the security forces, be it in Kashmir Valley or in Maoist hotbeds, even though that meant more lives of security personnel have been lost, particularly in Kashmir.We wanted to ensure that maoists did not take advantage of the lockdownP Sundarraj,IG, Bastar range, ChhattisgarhWith minor adjustments, we continued our operations during the lockdown. We wanted to ensure that Maoists did not take advantage of the lockdown. After taking necessary precautions, our special forces such as DRG (district reserve guards) and Co-BRA (a commando battalion) continued their operations against the Maoists.It was necessary because the lockdown period happened to coincide with CPI (Maoist)’s annual TCOC period (February-June, during which they launch what they call tactical counter-offensive campaign).Once the Covid-19 pandemic began, we had to spare some of our resources for other duties like manning inter-state and inter-district borders.Setting up three new camps also got delayed. In January-February, we, however, opened four camps, which are functional. Camps are critical not only for operational purposes but for bringing in confidence among the residents.The lockdown caused a major disruption in Maoists’ supply chains.None of them died of hunger as they must have extorted basic ration from villagers in the interiors. But as we have learnt, they failed to get medicines, uniforms, shoes, etc, which they usually collect before the onset of monsoon every year. Only a few senior Maoists might know what’s Maoism; for the rest, it’s just about violence. 76663792Whether ULFA’s Paresh Baruah comes for talks or not does not matterBhaskar jyoti mahanta, DGP, AssamA few days before the lockdown began, we had massive success in getting all factions of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland to shut shop. They gave up insurgency lock, stock and barrel, and deposited their weapons.Even then we suspected that there could be some more weapons concealed by some cadres which even their leaders might not be aware of. During the lockdown, we quietly undertook an operation to recover those hidden weapons. We succeeded in recovering hundreds of grenades, rocket launchers, AK-47s and weapons of various assortment.Also, during the lockdown, we almost wiped out an underground organisation created by NDFB’s Sambijit in Karbi Anglong. The other outfit we almost finished during the lockdown was the Dimasa National Liberation Army, which has always been mentored by the NSCN (I-M). The cadre of some smaller outfits in Karbi Anglong will soon surrender. Someone from Tezpur started a new militant outfit. We nipped it in the bud.On ULFA, my approach has been, it does not matter whether [its leader] Paresh Baruah comes to the talks or not. If he comes, it is okay. I don’t give too much importance to his return. ULFA (I) is in a pathetic state now, but it often attempts to foment sentiments. They recently tried to take advantage of the Baghjan fire accident by whipping up people’s sentiments. But we successfully stemmed it. 76663798Assam began this year on a good note, with 1,615 armed cadres belonging to three factions of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) surrendering on January 31, thereby ending a three-decade-old insurgency.Later, the police used the peak lockdown period to launch a clandestine operation to recover AK-47s and rocket launchers that were still lying in NDFB’s erstwhile strongholds, apart from targeting smaller outfits in the state’s hilly region. “We succeeded in recovering hundreds of grenades, rocket launchers, AK-47s and weapons of various assortment.Also, during the lockdown, we almost wiped out an underground organisation in Karbi Anglong created by NDFB’s Sambijit. The other outfit we almost finished off was the Dimasa National Liberation Army, which had always been mentored by NSCN (I-M),” says Assam DGP Bhaskar Jyoti Mahanta, adding that the police also stemmed a new militant outfit in Tezpur.The story of Assam insurgency is unlikely to end unless the anti-talks hawk and ULFA (Independent) chief Paresh Baruah — believed to be in a hideout on Myanmar-China border — comes on board. There were reports that he might join talks during the festival of Rongali Bihu. But he did not. When asked, DGP Mahanta brushes it aside. “It does not matter whether Paresh Baruah comes for talks or not. If he comes, it’s okay. I don’t give too much importance to his return,” he says.Unlike in J&K and the Northeast where militants are identifiable because of their social media interactions, Maoist insurgents are more elusive. They extort from contractors as well as the relatively well-off Gonds, Halbis and other tribals living in the interiors. They are trained to live in forests with minimum ration. They do not use gadgets, barring a few exceptions. This makes the job of the security forces more challenging in central India.In Bastar, the undisputed capital of Maoist insurgency today, two security forces lost their lives between March 23 and June 23, down from 12 in the same period last year, according to police data. Ten insurgents were also killed. But one has to factor in the fall in the exchange of fires — from 27 to 17.The Bastar Police suspect the lockdown disrupted the Maoists’ supply chains. P Sundarraj, IG of Bastar Range, says, “Since the lockdown, none of the Naxals died of hunger as they must have extorted ration from villagers. But, as we have learnt, they failed to get medicines, uniforms, shoes, etc, which they usually collect before monsoon every year.”This might sound like a positive for the state machinery but there is no certainty that insurgents won’t extend their period of TCOC (tactical counter-offensive campaign), which is usually February-June, when they trigger big attacks on security forces. In 2018, for instance, TCOC went on till winter when Chhattisgarh went for assembly polls.The lockdown has given the state an advantage vis-a-vis militancy, but in counter-insurgency, nothing can be left to chance. After all, India is nowhere near flattening the insurgency curve. 76663805 76664019

from Economic Times https://ift.tt/3i5IasB